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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has or had appropriate jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j) (as amended). An assignment of this case to the Utah Court 
of Appeals was appropriate. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court commit a clear abuse of discretion in denying Defendant's Motion 
Set Aside Judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion to set aside Judgment brought under Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is discretionary. A motion to set aside judgment is addressed to the discretion 
of the trial court which is accorded great deference, and the decision of the trial court will 
be reviewed only for clear abuse of discretion, to wit, that it is arbitrary or capricious. Birch 
v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), Pacer Sport & Cycle. Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 
616 (Utah 1975). 
ISSUE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
Defendant concedes that the foregoing issue was properly preserved for appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff commenced the underlying action against Richard Lund by filing a 
Complaint on or about September 9,1997, seeking recovery of the balance due and owing 
on an open account for automotive parts sold by Plaintiff to Defendant Lund (R. 1). 
Defendant Richard Lund was served on September 22,1997 (R. 7). A default certificate 
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and default judgment were entered on December 1, 1997. The Default Judgment was 
entered against Defendant Richard Lund for the total sum of $3,368.38 (R. 16 through 18). 
Defendant Lund filed a Motion to Set Aside the above-referenced Judgment on 
January 20, 1998. The Motion was supported by a Memorandum (R. 41), the Affidavit of 
Richard Lund (R. 38), and the Affidavit of Karen Lund (R. 36). Plaintiff filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition and the supporting Affidavit of Mark S. Swan (R. 58 and 63). 
The Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum, and the matter was submitted to the court. 
Oral argument was held before Judge McCleve on February 23, 1998. The Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside was denied by order of court dated March 23, 1998 (R.. 105). 
The present appeal ensued. The Defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed on April 
20, 1998 (R. 116). 
OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff objects to Defendant's Statement of Facts as it is not in compliance with 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and is misleading in many regards. Rule 24 
requires that all statements of fact be supported by a reference to the original record as 
paginated by the rendering court. None of the statements of fact set forth in the 
Defendant's brief are supported by record references and many statements are, in fact, 
unsupportable on the record. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This action was commenced by the filing of a Complaint on September 8, 
1997 (R. 1). 
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2. Defendant Richard A. Lund was personally served with a copy of the 
Summons and Complaint on September 22, 1997 (R. 7). Consequently, Mr. Lund's 
answer was due no later than October 12,1997. 
3. On October 10,1997, a verbal settlement agreement was reached between 
Defendant Richard A. Lund and Mark S. Swan, counsel for Plaintiff. The terms of that 
agreement were memorialized in correspondence sent to Defendant Lund on October 17, 
1997 (R. 62). 
4. The settlement agreement provided that Defendant Lund was to make three 
(3) consecutive monthly payments of $200.00 per month beginning October 20,1997. The 
agreement expressly provided that if payments were not received as agreed, the litigation 
would proceed (R. 62). 
5. The correspondence memorializing the settlement agreement was mailed to 
Mr. Lund at 376 West 800 South, Bountiful, Utah 84010. This was Mr. Lund's address of 
record according to the pleadings he filed in the District Court including pleadings he filed 
attempting to set aside the Judgment eventually entered (R. 54). 
6. The address to which the correspondence was mailed is also the address to 
which Mr. Lund's mail was being forwarded by the post office (R. 73). 
7. At oral argument, Mr. Lund acknowledged a debt due and owing and 
acknowledged agreeing to make payments of $200.00 per month, but denied receiving the 
confirmatory correspondence or knowing the payment due dates. (Transcript at R. 146, 
page 20, line 12 etseq.) 
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8* No payments were ever made pursuant to the aforementioned settlement 
agreement (R. 59). -
9. After the required payment of October 20,1997, went unpaid as well as the 
payment due November 20,1997, a default judgment was entered against Defendant on 
December 1, 1997 (R. 17). 
10. Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment ensued on 
January 19, 1998 (R. 50). 
11. After oral argument Judge McCleve found that the Defendant had failed to 
show excusable neglect and also that the Defendant had failed to demonstrate a 
meritorious defense to the underlying action. (Transcript R. 146 at page 23, lines 9 and 
14.) 
12. The motion to set aside was denied (R. 105). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS . • ••V 
When faced with the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Judgment, the District Court 
ruled that the Defendant failed to show excusable neglect. Therefore, the motion was 
denied. This conclusion reached by the Court was not a clear abuse of the District Court's 
discretion. Therefore, the ruling of the District Court should be sustained. 
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ARGUMENT 
• ' . : • ' < • - * -
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
A. The Burden is on the Defendant to Show Excusable Neglect Under Rule 
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60(b) requires a showing of reasonable justification for a Defendant's failure 
to respond to a Plaintiffs summons and complaint, and such excuse must constitute 
excusable neglect. Board of Education of Granite School District v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806 
(Utah 1963). The burden to make this showing is on the movant. Chrysler v. Chrysler, 303 
P.2d 995 (Utah 1956). Further, a defendant's obligation to show some "excusable" neglect 
is rather significant. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that illness alone is not a sufficient 
excuse. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1953). Likewise, inconvenience 
or press of other personal or business affairs does not constitute excusable neglect. Valley 
Leasing v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983). Further, a defendant is under an 
obligation to show a meritorious defense to the underlying claim. Erickson v. Schenkers 
International Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994). 
In conjunction with the Defendant's Motion to Set Aside, the Defendant failed to 
show any excusable neglect. The Defendant was served, personally, with a summons and 
complaint. The summons clearly states that an answer is due within 20 days or his default 
will be taken. The Defendant was served on September 22,1997, and his answer was due 
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October 12,1997. The summons which was served on Mr. Lund is clear and the necessity 
to file an answer would be clear to anyone who can read. In the Board of Education case 
cited above, a defendant attempted to set aside a default judgment based upon his 
misunderstanding of the process served upon him. His motion was denied and in 
response to that argument, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The summons is self-explanatory to anyone who can read, and this 
excuse is so unrealistic that the trial judge was not compelled to 
accept it. Furthermore, inasmuch as the application to set aside a 
default is equitable in nature, addressed to the conscience of the 
Court, it can and should consider all of the attendant facts and 
circumstances. In view of these facts, the trial court's conclusion of 
Mr. Cox's failure to heed the summons was his deliberate choice does 
not seem unreasonable, id. at 808. 
Finally, any motion to set aside is addressed to the discretion of the trial court which 
is accorded great deference. The decision of the trial court can only be reviewed for a 
clear abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Given the 
facts of the case before this Court, it cannot be said that the District Court committed a 
clear abuse of discretion requiring reversal. 
B. The Facts of the Present Case Support the District Court's Denial of the 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside 
The Statement of Facts submitted to this Court by the Defendant does not contain 
any record references. However, the record does sustain the following undisputed facts. 
The Defendant was properly served with process and his answer was due on October 12, 
1997. On October 10,1997, two days before his answer was due, the Defendant reached 
a verbal settlement agreement with Plaintiffs counsel. This fact was placed before the 
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District Court through the Affidavit of Mark S. Swan filed in opposition to the motion to set 
aside judgment (R. 62). The existence of a settlement agreement was also acknowledged 
by Defendant Lund at oral argument. (Transcript R. 146, Page 20, Line 12.) 
Mr. Lund acknowledged the existence of a debt. (R. 62 and Transcript R. 146, Page 
23, Line 9.) The settlement agreement called for payments in the amount of $200.00 per 
month. Evidence of the terms of the Agreement was again introduced into evidence 
through the Affidavit of Mark S. Swan (R. 59 and 61). The requirement for $200.00 per 
month payments was likewise acknowledged by Mr. Lund. (Transcript R. 146, Page 20, 
Line 12.) There was also evidence before the District Court that Defendant Lund was 
specifically advised that if he did not make payments as agreed, the litigation would 
proceed (R. 62). 
It is undisputed that Mr. Lund made no payments whatsoever (R. 59). Therefore, 
after waiting until November 24, 1997, after which two payments were past due, Plaintiff 
submitted default documents which were entered by the Court on December 1,1997 (R. 
17)1. These facts do not support a finding that Mr. Lund's neglect was excusable. On the 
contrary, his neglect was inexcusable. He could have paid as agreed after service of the 
Complaint or he could have answered. Defendant deliberately chose to do neither. It 
Plaintiff could have submitted the default documents on October 13, 1997, 
if there had not been an agreement. Therefore, Plaintiffs actions show it believed there 
was an agreement and Defendant received the benefit of an extra 6 1/2 weeks to answer 
the Complaint if he felt he had a defense. 
99_31745.CEC.wpd 7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cannot be said that the District Court committed a clear abuse of discretion in ruling that 
there was no excusable neglect. 
Mr. Lund's only argument was that he never received the confirmatory 
correspondence governing the settlement agreement. He argued that the confirmatory 
correspondence was sent to his ex-wife's address. Having not received the confirmatory 
correspondence, he assumed he was under no obligation to either make the agreed upon 
payments or file an answer. Such an assumption is not reasonable. 
First it should be noted that Plaintiff acted reasonably in sending confirmatory 
correspondence to the address of 376 West 800 South, Bountiful, Utah 84010. This was 
the address to which Mr. Lund's mail was being forwarded by the post office (R. 73). 
Further, this was the address which Mr. Lund himself used as a return address on his own 
pleadings filed thereafter (R. 54). If Mr. Lund is in the practice of using multiple and 
erroneous addresses and/or moving without providing creditors and/or the post office with 
forwarding addresses, Plaintiff cannot be held responsible. Thus, Defendant's contention 
that he did not receive the correspondence has questionable credibility, further justifying 
the Court's denial of his motion. 
In summary, Mr. Lund admits that an obligation is due and owing to the Plaintiff. He 
admits that he made an agreement to make payments and failed to do so. The Plaintiff, 
after entering into this settlement agreement, waited a very reasonable 6 !4 weeks for Mr. 
Lund to make payments as agreed and only then submitted default documents. The 
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District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's Motion and not allowing 
the Judgment to stand under these circumstances. 
An excellent case on point is Pacer Sport and Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616 
(Utah 1975). In Pacer Sport, a defendant, when sued, contacted plaintiffs counsel by 
telephone and denied his obligation on the debt. He was advised by Plaintiff's counsel that 
regardless of his feelings, the matter would proceed and a default would be taken. After 
entry of default, the defendant moved to have it set aside and argued that because he had 
contacted plaintiffs counsel and advised plaintiffs counsel that he did not feel obligated 
for the debt, that ". . . he assumed the action had somehow been taken care of and 
therefore took no steps to file an answer to the complaint." id. at 617. The motion to set 
aside was denied and the denial was upheld by Utah Supreme Court. 
The case presently before this Court is one in which the District Court's denial of a 
motion to set aside is even more supportable. Unlike the defendant in Pacer Sport, the 
Defendant admits the existence of the underlying debt. Further, rather than being mislead 
by vague conversations which he believed put an end to the action, the Defendant admits 
that a payment agreement was entered into with Plaintiffs attorney, and the Defendant 
was specifically advised in writing that litigation would proceed if he did not make payments 
as agreed, and Defendant admits he made no payments on the debt in the 6 1/_ weeks 
before the default judgment was entered. There is simply no excuse for the fact that 
Defendant Lund failed to make payments as agreed or file an answer to keep a default 
judgment from being entered. 
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Another case on point is Chrysler v. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 995 (Utah 1956). In 
Chrysler the plaintiff/movant began a divorce action in the Seventh District Court. His wife 
answered, and consequently the matter was properly before that Court. A default 
judgment was then entered in favor of the wife, on her counterclaim, and against the 
plaintiff while he was out of the state trying to commence a second and competing divorce 
action in the State of Nevada. The Utah Supreme Court appeared to put great emphasis 
on what it described as the movant's"... devious conduct to circumvent the effects of the 
action." id. at 997. * 
The Utah Supreme Court stated: "A prime precedent to the granting of such relief 
[setting aside a default judgment] is that the movant demonstrate that he comes to the 
court with clean hands and in good faith." id. Defendant Richard Lund does not come 
before this Court with clean hands. 
He admits the existence of the underlying debt. He admits he entered into a 
settlement agreement after being served. He admits he agreed to make payments under 
the settlement agreement in the amount of $200.00 per month. He admits he made no 
such payment. In essence, Defendant Lund's argument is that, with litigation pending 
against him, he can enter into payment agreements and thereafter do nothing and 
reasonably expect that no further action will be taken. This is the kind of argument that the 
Utah Supreme Court described in the Board of Education case as so unrealistic that the 
trial judge was not compelled to accept it. Supra at 808. Judge McCleve did not accept 
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Defendant Lund's argument, and it cannot be said that denial of his Motion was capricious 
or arbitrary. 
C. Additional Arguments Raised by Defendant Lund are Irrelevant. 
Bankruptcy 
Mr. Lund's arguments that his obligation to Plaintiff was somehow discharged by his 
wife's bankruptcy are meritless. The record establishes that the Plaintiff is seeking 
recovery of sums due and owing for merchandise provided to Mr. Lund on open account 
between late 1994 and May 1997 (R. 2). Consequently, his wife's bankruptcy of 1993 is 
irrelevant. The debt which Plaintiff is attempting to recover is a post-petition debt and 
therefore not discharged by a 1993 bankruptcy. (11 U.S.C. § 506(b)). In fact, the Affidavit 
of Karen Lund which Mr. Lund himself filed in support of his motion states that Karen Lund 
did no business with Plaintiff after 1993 (R. 37). Consequently, it is acknowledged that 
only Mr. Lund was doing business with Plaintiff thereafter. The Chapter 7 bankruptcy of 
Karen Lund did not discharge the indebtedness of her co-debtor (11 U.S.C. § 524(e)). 
Further, Mr. Lund acknowledges that it is his wife's bankruptcy to which he refers. 
Consequently, any discharge granted in that proceeding would have no bearing on Mr. 
Lund's liability. 
Standing 
Mr. Lund also argues that BCW Enterprises lacks standing to bring the present 
case. Apparently Mr. Lund always thought of the business as "Warner Truckland". This 
argument was never raised before the District Court and should not be considered on 
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appeal. However, Plaintiffs Complaint clearly identifies BCW Enterprises, Inc. as the 
Plaintiff doing business as Warner Truckland. There is no question that Plaintiff is the 
proper party in interest. ' 
Constitutionality 
Finally, Defendant Lund contends that Rule 55, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
governing default judgments is unconstitutional as a rule promulgated by the Supreme 
Court of the State rather than one specifically passed by the legislature. By expansion of 
this argument, Defendant Lund would have this Court find that all the Rules of Civil 
Procedure are unconstitutional on the same basis. This is simply not the case. The 
legislative branch has the authority to delegate to the courts the power to promulgate 
appropriate rules. Such rules as are promulgated by authority of the legislative branch 
have the force of law. In re Brooks Fashion Stores, Inc., et aL 124 B.R. 436 (S.D. N.Y. 
1991). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Lund was properly served with process on September 22, 1997. His 
default was entered 70 days later. During the interim he had entered into and breached 
a settlement agreement, the terms of which expressly provided that the litigation would 
proceed if the required payments were not made. Defendant Lund attempted to set aside 
the default judgment, but his motion was denied by the District Court. 
In light of the fact that Mr. Lund acknowledged the existence of the debt, his promise 
to make payments, and his failure to make payments, it cannot be said that the District 
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Court's action was unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary. As the action of the District Court 
is only to be reviewed for abuse of discretion, this Court should affirm the underlying ruling. 
DATED this 3 -2* day of February, 1999. 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
Maffk SI. Swan 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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States mail, postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Richard Lund 
\ 1090 West 500 South 
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